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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we develop a game-theoretic version of the right-to-manage 
model of firm-level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are 
explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages 
and employment react to changes in various labor and product market vari­
ables. We show that our comparative statics results hinge crucially on the 
strategic nature of the game, which in turn is determined by the relative 
bargaining power of unions and managers. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the nature of interactions among firms and among unions, 
when setting wages within an oligopolistic market. Standard models of 
wage bargaining in industries with market power assume that the product 
market is monopolistic, thereby abstracting from some interesting interac­
tions between firms and unions that should affect the outcome of collective 
bargaining.! This is so in spite of numerous pieces of empirical work on the 
estimation of wage equations at the firm/industry level, where variables suCh 
as concentration ratios or market shares are introduced, in a more-br-less ad­
hoc way, as potential explanatory variables connected with market power2 
More anecdotal evidence comes from the evolution of industrial relations dur­
ing the 1980s in the UK, which shows an increasing importance of company 
performance for wage setting. Commenting on this evolution, Metcalf (1993, 
p. 279) states: "Nowadays the link between the product and labour markets 
would be central to any investigation. It is largely because of this connection 
that the industrial relations system has evolved in such a way that it can no 
longer stymie company performance. Any such lack of performance can no 
longer be laid at the door of the unions." 
In response to that deficiency in the modeling of wage bargaining, there 
have been in recent years several attempts to properly analyze strategic inter­
action effects in unionized oligopolistic industries. To our knowledge, the first 
study to do so is Davidson (1988), where the relationship between bargaining 
-5-
structure and wage outcomes in unionized industries is studied using non­
cooperative game-theoretic results. ArOlmd the same time, in independent 
. 
work, Dowrick (1989) used the conjectural variations framework in oligopoly 
models to study how product market power and profitability relate to wages. 
In particular, his paper focuses on how the effects of union coordination on 
wages depend on the bargaining situation, namely, whether bargaining is over 
wages and employment or just about wages. More recently, further work by 
Dowrick (1993), Dowrick and Spencer (1994) and Santoni (1994), using slight 
variations of the previous models, analyze various topics of interest, like the 
attitude of unions towards labor-saving innovations, the relative degree of 
aggressiveness of enterprise and craft-based unions, or the strategic effects of 
international trade on domestic wage setting. 
These papers are, however, developed under the assumption that unions 
at different firms all have the same bargaining strength, and that all firms 
have access to the same production technology. In this symmetric setting, 
it is impossible to characterize the impact of changes in a firm's bargaining 
scenario (defined by the bargaining strength of the union operating at that 
firm, the firm's technology, and the characteristics of the product and labor 
markets in which the firm operates) on its counterparts. Most importantly, 
these papers exclUSively focus on settings where the strategic nature of the 
game is such that an increase in a firm's wage unambiguously raises its com­
petitors' wages, a feature which can be shown to bias their results in several 
instances. 
The model in this paper overcomes the problems just cited. It is a static 
model of firm-level bargaining in a duopolistic industry seiling differentiated 
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products, where firms are all unionized, but where the unions' bargaining 
power differs from one firm to another. To simplify the exposition of the 
main results, we take a number of shortcuts. First, we develop an asym­
metric version of the right-to-manage model of firm-level wage bargaining, 
where the choice of employment is left to the firm, since this seems to be 
a reasonable assumption on empirical grounds.3 Second, we concentrate di­
rectly on the non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the two union­
two firm structure, rather than on the encompassing conjectural variations 
framework.' Third, we make a number of simplifying assumptions, like the 
use of linear demand functions and uniformly distributed demand shocks. On 
the other hand, these simplifications allow us to introduce more complexity 
along other key dimensions (uncertainty in demand, more general union pref­
erences), thus generallzing what is found in the previously cited papers, and 
thereby enriching the model's predictions. 
Under the previous assumptions, we show that unions are more likely 
to press for wage increases at the bargaining table when their fellows at 
competing firms enjoy higher wages, which is a well-established empirical 
factS The reason is that each union recognizes that higher wages at rival 
firms lead to a more favorable competitive standing in the product market 
for its own firm and, therefore, a lower risk of layoffs for a given wage increase. 
By the same token, from the viewpoint of managers, an increase in the rival's 
wage raises the marginal desirability of a wage cut. The reason being this 
time that, under a wage rise in the rival firm, it becomes easier to gain market 
share, which in addition becomes more valuable as the price-cost margin also 
increases. Thus, in the now standard terminology introduced by Bulow et 
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aL (1985), wages are strategic complements from the unions' point of view, 
whereas they are strategic substitutes for managers. 
Given the previous result, it is clear that the overall strategic nature of 
the game (i. e., whether the overall game is one of the strategic complements 
or substitutes) depends on the relative power of unions and managers at 
the bargaining table. Moreover, it can be shown that the results from the 
comparative statics analysis of how wages respond to 'changes in various 
dimensions of the labor and product markets (like the level of unemployment 
benefits or the degree of industry concentration) depend crucially on that 
strategic nature. For instance, take the effect of an increase in the bargaining 
strength of a union on the wages of both firms: if the game is one of strategic 
complements, wages will increase in both firms, whereas if it is one of strategic 
substitutes, the own firm's wage will increase but the other firm's wage will 
decrease. These effects have largely been ignored in the existing literature 
because of the (implicit) assumption that the relative bargaining power of 
unions and managers is such that the game features strategic complements, 
thereby finding that increasing the bargaining power of Qne firm's union 
power unambiguously raises wages in all firms. 
The different viewpoints of managers and unions regarding the strategic 
nature of wages also have implications for the determination of the bargaining 
structure at the industry level and the negotiation outcomes. On this score, 
we not only derive similar results to those found in Davidson (1988) and 
Dowrick (1989), but also give a natural interpretation of why unions are more 
likely to coordinate their wage claims than firms' managers, as happens in 
many countries. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our duopoly 
model and solves for .equilibrium wages and employment. Section 3 presents 
comparative statics results and develops intuitions for them. In section 4 we 
extend the model of the previous sections to study I,he relationship between 
market power and wages and the role of competition policy to moderate wage 
inflation (section 4,1); and also compare the outcomes of wage bargaining 
with firm-level unions and industry-wide unions (section 4.2). Section 5 
draws some concluding remarks. 
2 THE MODEL 
2.1 THE BASIC SETUP 
This is a static model of firm-level bargaining in a duopolistic industry, where 
oompeting firms are all unionized and demand is ex ante uncertain. We as­
sume for simplicity that there is a single union and a single manager per 
firm. Managers and unions are all risk-neutral, maximizing their own ex­
pected payoffs, At each firm, wages are bargained over ex ante, taking as 
given the oompetitor's wage, oonsidering their impact on the product mar­
ket equilibrium outcomes. Employment levels, instead, are decided ex post 
by managers alone. They set employment (or, equivalently, production) si­
muitaneously and non-cooperatively to compete for the demand for a good 
which may be differentiated according to brand name and/or quality (j, e" 
the interaction in the output market is Cournotian).6 
eThe product market: Firm j faces an inverse linear demand function 
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equal to Pj = f (Q, IJ) + Vj = IJ - Q + Vj (j = 1,2); where Pj is firm j's price, 
IJ is a common demand shock distributed uniformly on the interval [e., OJ, 
where qj denotes firm j's output, Q = q, + q" and Vj 2: 0 measures the 
consumers' willingness to pay for brand j (which we take to be positively 
related to firm j's R&D effort, and advertising and marketing expenditures). 
Firms use only labor to produce according to the production function 
qj = ajNj, where Nj denotes firm j's labor force, and aj its productivity. 
From the previous assumptions, firm j's ex-post profits are given by: 
7rj(qj (lJ) IIJ) = qj(IJ)(1J - Q + Vj) - wjNj 
= qj(IJ)(1J - Q - iiij), j = 1, 2 
(1) 
where Wj is firm j's wage, iiij = (wj/aj) - Vj, and qj (IJ) is firm j's output 
in state IJ. Ex-ante expected profits IIj are then equal to Ee(7rj(qj (IJ) IIJ)) 
(where Ee denotes the expectations operator with respect to 0). We assume 
that the firm j's manager payoff function coincides with firm j's profits (so 
that in this model there is no separation between ownership and control) . 
• Union objectives: We assume that layoffs take place by random as­
signment and that each firm's union maximizes the expected income of every 
member.? The objective function of the union associated with the j-th firm 
is then given by: 
Uj = SjWj + (1- Sj)w·, j = 1,2 (2) 
where Sj is the probability of staying employed at the same firm in the 
following period (the survival probability), and w· the expected income of 
a worker who loses his job. More precisely, w· = <pb + (1 - <p) w·, where 
<p is the probability of being unemployed, b the unemployment benefit, and 
-10-
we the competitive wage8,9 We denote union j's membership by Mj, also 
referred to below as the insiders. Thus the survival probability of a union 
member, Sj E [0, IJ, is given by: 
Sj = Pr{Nj(8) > Mj} + Pr{Nj(8) :s; Mj}(Ee (Nj(8) I Nj(8) :s; Mj))/Mj (3) 
for j = 1,2 and where Nj(8) = qj(8)/aj . 
• Wage bargaining: The manager and the union associated with firm j 
choose a wage Wj to maximize firm j's joint surplus: 
Maxw; n;(WI, W2) = IIj + (3jUj 
subject to ( i )  7rj(qj (8) I 8) 2: 0 for all 8, and (ii) Wj 2: w". 
(4) 
where (3j denotes firm j's union bargaining powerlO Restriction (i) ensures 
that both managers and workers are willing to preserve firm j as an ongoing 
concern in any possible state of nature: bankruptcy costs are assumed to be 
so large that a manager would close down his firm rather than face negative 
profits in any possible state of nature. Since in equilibrium profit margins 
cannot be negative, restriction (i) in (4) can be rewritten as qj(8) 2: 0 for all 
8. That is, restriction (i) implies that for all demand states, both firms are 
active in the product market.ll Restriction (ii) states that no worker would 
accept a job offer paying less than w". 
A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) for our (two-stage) game is, there­
fore, an array {(W;, W,); (q; (WI,W2;8),q,(WI,W2; II))}, where (w; ,w,) is the 
vector of equilibrium wages and q;(WI, W2; II) is firm j's equilibrium output, 
such that: 
(i) for any given II and (WI, W2), {(q;(WI, W2; II), q, (w" W2; II))} is a Cournot­
Nash equilibrium for the product market subgame, i. e. , q;O E arg max7rj(qj(lI) I 
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0) for all j, and 
(ii) for all j, w; E arg max{rl;(wl,W2) I q;(Wl,W2;0) ::0: 0 for all 0, and 
Wj � wa}.1
2 
In order to ensure perfection we now proceed to solve the model by back­
ward induction. 
2.2 PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION 
In the second stage of the game, given wages and the realization of 0, man· 
agers set production (employment) levels to maximize ex-post profits. It is a 
standard result that, for those parameter configurations such that both firms 
are active In the product market irrespective of the actual state of nature, 
there is a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the product market subgame 
where 
q;(Wl, W2; 0) = (0 - 2w; + wi)/3 
N;(O) = q;(Wl, W2; O)/a; 
7r;(q;(Wl' W2; 0) 10) = (q;(Wl' W2; 0))2 
(5) 
for all 0 E [�, iij. From the expression of qj(Wl, W2; 0) in (5), it is immediate 
that those parameter configurations for which q;(Wl, W2;�) ::0: 0 ensure that 
restriction (i) in (4) holds. This latter condition will be used below to set 
bounds on the feasible set of optimal wages at the bargaining stage. 
Furthermore, from equation (5) it is easy to check that firm j's output, 
employment and profits are increasing in 0 (the state of demand), Wi (the 
competitor's wage), a; (firm j's productivity), and v; (consumers' willingness 
to pay for firm j's product); and decreasing in a; (competitor's productivity), 
-
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and Vi (consumers' willingness to pay for the competitor's product). In addi­
tion, ,,;(qj(WI, W2; 0) I 0) is decreasing and convex in w; (for aU e and j), and 
so is II; = E8[(qj(WI,W2;O))2]. Hence, were wages decided by managers in 
isolation, they would be equal to w·, the alternative income.13 Furthermore, 
using (5) it is easy to check that 
a2II· 
awja�i :5 0 for all i,j (6) 
so that, from the managers' point of view, wages are stmtegic substitutes: an 
increase in the rival's wage raises the marginal desirability of a wage cut for 
the firm's manager. The reason is that, as the rival increases his wage, it 
becomes easier to steal his business, which in addition becomes more valuable, 
as the price-cost margin also increases. I. 
2.3 UNIONS' INCENTIVES 
We concluded the previous subsection by studying the managers' incentives 
to set wages. Now, before discussing the ·bargaining equilibrium outcome, we 
shall overview the corresponding unions' incentives. 
First, notice that the survival probability Sj given in equation (3) can 
also be written as 
(7) 
where /:;. = (0 -!!.) and OJ is such that N;(Oj) = Mj.l5 That is, for all e � 
OJ, firm j's insiders are fully employed. Otherwise, some of them are laid 
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off. Except for the first region in (7), where full employment implies that 
all derivatives of s; are zero, substitution of N;(O) from (5) into (7) yields 
that s; is unambiglIously decreasing in wi. That is, the probability of being 
laid off increases with higher wages, because a higher wage places the firm 
at a worse competitive position in the product market, leading to market 
share loses and employment cuts. Moreover, it is easily shown (see Result 1 
in Appendix 1) that s; is increasing in Wi and concave in w;, and also that 
the second cross-derivative of s; with respect to w; and Wi is positive. The 
latter two results do not hold for the third region in (7), where M; is large, 
since s; is linear in wages there. As will be seen below, in this third region 
-which is the only one considered in Davidson (1988), Dowrick (1989) and 
most of the related literature-, wages are necessarily strategic complements, 
but this need not be the case in the second and third regions. As a result, 
our model encompasses previous results regarding strategic complementarity 
and also opens the possibility of finding strategic substitutability. 
Taking equations (2), (5) and (7) together we have that U; is (weakly) 
concave in wi' and that it is increasing in w; if s; is larger, in absolute value, 
than (as;/aw;)(w; - w"). This is always true in the first region of (7), since 
the latter product is zero, while in the other two regions, the sign of aU; / aw; 
is ambiguous. Concerning the strategic nature of wages, they are stmtegic 
complements from the point of view of unions. In fact, 
(8) 
The intuition is as follows: as Wi increases, firm j's competitive standing 
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in the product market is improved, raising both its production and employ­
ment, which in turn increases Sj (i. e., OSj/ow, 2: 0). Moreover, the negative 
impact of a wage increase on the survival probability is also tempered as w, 
rises (that is, 02Sj/OWjOW, 2: 0). To summarize, when w, rises, the union 
associated to firm j can press further for an increase in Wj without fearing 
layoffs so much. Therefore, workers' observed behavior of claiming wage in­
creases to match their fellow workers' wages in competing firms is here shown 
to be a fully rational decision. While not denying their relevance, we do not 
need to refer to any psychological or sociological arguments, like felt fair pay 
or the equity theory (as it has been standard in the bargaining literature 
-see, for instance, Martin (1992)-)' to explain this pattern of behavior. 
Note that standard models of monopolistic competition Ii la Dixit-Stiglitz 
and wage bargaining fail to capture the strategic effects described above. 
These models assume away any strategic interaction (i.e., 02Uj/OWjOW, = 
o2rrj/oWjOW, = 0, for all i f j, i, j = 1,2), by considering that the wage in 
one firm has a negligible impact on the demand for the goods produced by 
other firms. This strong assumption would be valid within our framework 
only if the product market was atomistic, and, in general, it has important 
implications for the understanding of the determinants of equllibrium wages 
and employment (see sections 3 and 4). 
2.4 EQUILIBRIUM WAGES 
In response to an increase in the wage at the competitor firm, managers' and 
unions' wage-setting incentives are thus in clear contradiction. Managers try 
-15-
to cut wages further in order to improve firms' operating margins and win 
additional market share. Unions, on the other hand, pursue to raise the 
earnings of their constituencies taking into account, however, the effect of 
their wage claims on employment. That is, the strategic nature of a wage­
setting game between managers differs from the strategic nature of the same 
game if played between unions. Wages are strategic substitutes for the former 
game while they are strategic complements for the latter. 
This confrontation between unions and managers at the firm level is re­
solved through the bargaining process. In order to characterize its solution, 
it is useful to notice that the objective function nj is, in general, not quasi­
concave in Wj, since ITj is convex and Vj is concave. So, we cannot ensure 
either existence or uniqueness of a pure-strategy equilibrium for all admissible 
parameter values. All is well known, the lack of quasi-concavity of the ob­
jective functions generates mscontinuities in the best-reply functions, which 
may lead to either non-existence or multipliCity of equilibria .. Hence, in this 
section we prove existence by construction. Also note that restrictions (i) 
and (ii) in equation (4) imply that Wj must be within the range [w·,wj], 
where wj = aj{/l + Vj).!6 
In view of this feasible wage set, the value of Wj which maximizes nj for 
a given Wi (i.e., fjrm j's best reply) may be a comer or an interior solution. 
For example, if {3j is low enough, then the shape of nj is dominated by 
the properties of the profit function IIi, which is decreasing and convex for 
all feasible wages, so that firm j's best reply is w·. Similarly, there exist 
parameter configurations for which wj is firm j's best reply. Leaving aside 
the pure corner solutions, the typical shape of nj as a function of Wi is given 
- 16 -
in Figure 1. It arises from two facts: first, for the functional forms chosen 
for II; and U; in this paper, !I; is cubic in w; (i. e., there is at most one 
interior maximum); second, the convex part of the function always precedes 
the concave part (this is proved in Result 2 in Appendix 1). Hence, in this 
case there will always exist an interior maximum where !I; is locally concave. 
This may be a global maximum (solid line in Figure 1) and, thus, firm j's 
best reply, or it may be just a local one (dashed line), so that w' is the 
best reply. Therefore, if w; E (w·, wf) is the best reply of firm j given Wi, 
the function !I; must be locally concave in a neighborhood of W; and the 
condition nj(w"Wj) 2:: nj(WilWa) must hold. From now on we concentrate 
on this last case. 
In an interior equilibrium, wages jointly solve the following first-order 
conditions: 
O!l;/ow; = oIl;/ow; + {3;oU;/ow; 
= 
0, j = 1,2. (9) 
From this equation, and since all; / ow; < 0 for all w;, we have that, at 
any interior equilibrium, oU;/ow; must be positive. This implies that equi­
librium wages are too low from the point of view of unions and too high from 
the perspective of managers. A direct implication is that, ceteris paribus, 
union activity (represented by {3; > 0 for all j) lowers firms' profitability, in 
accordance with the existing evidence.l7 
Furthermore, in accordance with the arguments above, a pair (wi, w2) 
solving the first-order conditions in (9) constitutes a proper interior equi­
librium if no deviation is privately optimal. Necessary and sufficient con­
ditions for this are: (i) {3; � 7J; (wi, W2) = _ (02I1;/ow;)/(02U;/ow;), with 
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7Jj (W�, W2) E (0,00), for all j (with the second-order derivatives evaluated 
at (W�,W2))' so that second-order conditions are satisfied locally; and (ii) 
!lj(w;,w;) :::: !lj(w;,wa), for all i,j = 1,218 
The local strategic nature of the bargaining game at an interior equi­
librium (w�,w2) (i.e., the sign of 82!lj/8wj8wi) also depends on the exact 
magnitude of f3j. If f3j :::: f3; (W�,W2) = _(82ITj/8wj8w;)/(82Uj/8wj8wi), 
with f3; (W� , W2) E (0,00), for all j (with the cross-derivatives evaluated at 
(w�,w2))' then 82!lj/8wj8wi :::: 0, and vice versa. That is, provided union 
bargaining power is suffiCiently high, the bargaining game shows strategic 
complementarity among its decision variables. Otherwise, it is characterized 
by strategic substitutability. It can be also shown (see Result 3 in Appendix 
1) that f3; (W�,W2) :::: 7Jj (W�,W2) for all j and (W�,W2)' so that both the 
strategic substitutes and the strategic complements cases are relevant for 
our comparative statics analysis below. Figure 2 depicts the relevant ranges 
of f3j defined by the cutoff points f3;, 7Jj, and another cutoff point, fjj (defined 
below), which ensures stability of the equilibrium. 
We now present two examples of equilibria satisfying the conditions above. 
Figure 3 shows a symmetric example of a unique interior equilibrium with 
local strategic substitutability (i.e., downward-sloping best-reply functions) 
and Figure 4 shows one with local strategic complementarity (i. e., upward­
sloping best-reply functions). (The lines appearing in the graphs represent 
the first-order conditions, but only their solid segments constitute proper 
best-reply functions.) All parameters are the same in both figures, except 
for f3, which is higher in the second one.19 
-19-
Figure 2. Characterization of interior equilibria with f3; = f3i 
i3 fj p' 
- 1--- 1----- 1 ----
-- 1-- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - ----> 
second order conditions satisfied 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- 1 - - - - - - - - - ----> 
strategic substitutability strategic complementarity 
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Had we restricted our analysis to those parameter sets for which 0;·> (j 
by assuming M; sufficiently large -as is typically done in the literature-, 
we would have concluded that -there is no equilibrium featuring strategic 
substitutability (proof of this statement is given in Result 4 in Appendix 1). 
To conclude this section, let us remark again that we cannot ensure 
the uniqueness of equilibrium, even if best-reply functions are single-valued. 
First, since the objective functions are not necessarily quasi-concave, the 
best-reply functions may be discontinuous, raising the possibility of multiple 
equilibria, as illustrated in Figure 5a. Second, the shape of the objective func­
tions implies that the best-reply functions are in general non-linear, which 
again opens the door to multiplicity (as depicted in Figure 5b). 
3 COMPARATIVE STATICS 
The goal of this section is to analyze how equilibrium wages and employment 
react to changes in their basic determinants. How�ver, given the lack of global 
quasi-concavity, our comparative statics analysis is only valid locally. The 
parameters of interest for this analysis are: w· (the expected income of a 
worker who loses his job), {3, and {32 (the bargainlng power of the unions 
associated to firrns 1 and 2, respectively), M, and M2 (firms' respective 
numbers of insiders), a, and <12 (firms' labor productivity), and finally, V, 
and V2 (the indices of brand and quality differentiation). 
Let 0 = (w·, (3" f3." M" M2, a" a2, V" V2) be the vector of parameters of 
interest, and Ok its k-th element (k = 1, ... , 9). Then, by implicit differentia-
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tion: 
8'0.d8wI8w, ) -I ( 8'0.1/8w18ok ) 
820.2/ 8w� &0.'; 8w28ok 
(10) 
where all cross-derivatives in (10) are evaluated at equilibrium values. From 
(10) we have that for all i # j and ali k, 
where 
and 
8wi/8ok = 'TJjh 
'TJj = (820.j/8Wj8wi) (8'0.i/8wi8ok )- (8'0.;j8wf )(820.j/8Wj8ok ) ,  
strategic e f  feet direct ef feet 
(11) 
Any sensible comparative statics exercise requires at least local stability. 
It can be easily shown that for any interior equilibrium (wi, W2), there exists 
a critical value i3j (wi, w2 )  E C8j (wi ,w2), ,8; (wi ,w2)) ,  such that if ,8j 2: 
i3j (wi, W2) the equilibrium is stable, implying that the denominator of (11) 
is positive.2O As a result, there may exist stable equilibria featuring either 
strategic substitutability or complementarity (see Figure 2). For example, 
the unique interior equilibria in Figures 3 and 4 are both stable. 
Hence, under stability, the sign of 8w; /8ok is equal to the sign of the 
numerator of (11), 'TJj. A change in the k-th parameter of interest, Ok , has 
two kinds of effects on equilibrium wages: direct effects, captured by the sec­
onel term in 'TJj ,  and strategic effects, represented by the first term in 'TJj. The 
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direct effects lead to shifts of the firms' reaction functions, while the strate­
gic effects lead to movements along the reaction functions. (Notice again 
that traditional monopolistic competition models omit these latter strategic 
effects by implicitly assuming that 82flj /8W/'JWi = 0 for all i # j.) 
From (10) and (11) it is clear that to derive our comparative statics 
exercises we need to go into the signs of the cross-derivatives 82flj/awj8Ctk 
and, therefore, into the signs of 82Uj/8wj8Ctk and 82rrj/8wj8Ctk , for all j, k. 
The latter expressions represent the change in the bargaining attitudes' of 
unions and managers, respectively, when Ctk rises. Table 1 summarizes these 
signs. 
Most results in Table 1 are rather intuitive. For instance, an increase 
in w· (due to either an increase in the unemployment benefit, b, or in the 
competitive wage, w', or else to a fall in the probability of unemployment, 'P) 
raises the union's marginal utility from a wage increase (i.e., 82Uj/8wj8w" 2: 
0), as laid-off workers benefit from an increase in their expected income 
(decreasing the cost of becoming unemployed at the margin). Consequently, 
raising w· leads to a higher firm j's wage, Wj, for a given value of Wi, i # j. 
This is also the case when the number of firm j's insiders shrinks. A fall in 
Mj raises the survival probability, Sj, for any employee of firm j and for given 
wages and, more importantly, makes Sj less sensitive to an increase in Wj. 
Therefore, the union is more likely to press further in order to raise the wage 
bill of its own firm, since layoffs become less 'of a threat for its membership. 
Other results are, perhaps, less intuitive. For instance, an increase in firm 
j's productivity, aj, has ambiguous effects. First, it affects the managers' 
incentives at the margin, but in an ambiguous fashion. On the one hand, 
-
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TABLE 1 
CROSS-DERIVATIVES OF II;, U;, AND 0; WITH RESPECT 
TO w; AND THE MODEL'S PARAMETERS' 
",' ",2 
W· (3; M; (3i Mi a; ai V; Vi 
II; 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 + 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (7) (0) (-) (0) 
U; + 0 0 0 7 + 
(+) (0) (
'-
) (0) (0) (7) (0) (+) (0) 
0; + + 0 0 7 7 7 7 
(+) (+) (
-
) (0) (0) (7) (0) (7) (0) 
, Signs in parentheses correspond to the same cross-derivatives for the 
monopolistic competition model. 
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cutting wages becomes more attiactive in this case since it is easier to steal 
the rival's market- share. However, as the firm becomes more productive, 
wage increases become relatively less costly. Second, it also changes the 
union's marginal utility from a wage increase. This latter effect does not 
have a clear sign either. The reason is that an increase in aj affects firm j's 
employment, and the survival probability, in two opposite ways. For a given 
level of output qj an increase in aj makes some workers redlmdant (thus 
reducing 8j) but, on the other hand, the higher aj the more competitive is 
firm j in the product market, which raises qi, N; and 8j. The first of these 
two effects on aj reduces the union's marginal utility from a wage increase, 
while the second effect tends to raise it. 
If we analyze the effect on firm j's bargaining agents of an increase in firm 
i's productivity, the ambiguity still persists. Concerning the attitudes of firm 
j's manager, a rise in a; makes him more accommodating at the bargaining 
table since a greater wage reduction would be necessary to steal market share 
from firm i (i.e., 82ITjj8w/Ja; 2': 0). However, the union associated to firm 
j restrains its wage claims at the same time, as 8j becomes more sensitive to 
wage increases (i.e., 82Ujj8wj8a; ::; 0). 
As in the previous case, an increase in firm i's brand quality, Vi, makes 
firm j's manager less willing to undercut the rival's wages as its offer becomes 
relatively less valuable for consumers, and hence his ability to steal firm i's 
market share is reduced (that is, 82ITjj8wj8vi 2': 0). However, it also reduces 
the union's incentives to press for wage increases (82Ujj8wj8vi ::; 0) since it 
raises the sensitivity of 8j to Wj. Exactly the opposite holds when we consider 
the impact of an increase in Vj on the firm j's manager and union. 
-
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We can thus distinguish between two types of parameters. The parame­
ters in (>1 = (w·, /31, 132, MI, M2) are those for which the sign of 82D.;/8w;8(>k 
is unambiguous, whilst for those in (>2 = (al,a2,vI,v2) this sign depends on 
the exact value of /3;. The next subsection studies analytically the com­
parative statics of equilibrium wages with respect to the parameters in (>1. 
Section 3.2 deals with the corresponding results for the parameters in (>2, by 
means of numerical simulations. 
3.1 ANALYTICAL RESULTS 
From equation (11) and the results in Table 1, Propositions 1 and 2 below 
follow immediately. (Table 2 summarizes them.) 
Proposition 1 At any interior equilibrium (wi, w,) featuring strategic com­
plementarity, firm j's equilibrium wage (employment) is locally increasing 
(decreasing) in w·,/3;, and /3i, and locally decreasing (increasing) in M; and 
Mi, i i j, i,j = 1,2. 
Proposition 1 characterizes the bargaining outcome when wages are local 
strategic complements. In this case, firms j's equilibrium wage, wi, is shown 
to rise with w· and /3;, and to fall with M;, as the standard monopolistic 
competition model would predict (see Layard et al. (1991)). But wi can also 
be shown to rise with the rival's union power, /3" and to fall with the rival's 
number of insiders, Mi' The last two effects are exclusively strategic so that 
they cannot be captured by a model such as the monopolistic competition 
model, which disregards strategic interactions among competing firms. Fur-
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TABLE 2 
EFFECTS OF UNAMBIGUOUSLY-SIGNED PARAMETERS 
ON EQUILIBRIUM WAGES (8w;/8a1) 
Model w· {3; M; {3, M, 
Symmetric models' + + a 0 
This model: 
- Strategic complements ({3j � (3j) + + + 
- Strategic substitutes ({3; < (3j) ? + + 
, This includes both non-strategic models, like the model of monopolistic 
competition (e.g. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) or Layard et al. (1991)), 
and strategic oligopoly models imposing symmetry across firms (e. g. David­
son (1988) or Dowrick (1989)). 
- 30-
thermore, these results do not appear in Davidson (1988) or Dowrick (1989) 
because of their symmetry assmnption by which f3j = f3 for all j: 
Consider, for example, an increase in f3i' This has a direct and positive 
effect on Wi for any given Wj (i.e., 02!!;joW/Jf3i 2: 0). Firm j's reaction 
function remains unchanged, instead, since 02!!j/OWj0f3i = O. However, the 
initial increase in Wi due to a greater f3i, leads to a subsequent increase in 
Wj, as wages are strategic complements. The final impact of an increase in 
f3i is, therefore, to raise both equilibrimn wages w; and wj. Notice that the 
impact of f3i on w; is purely strategic. 
Moreover, the impact on w; of changes in w·, f3;, and M;, although 
qualitatively identical in the monopolistic competition and the oligopolistic 
models, may be quantitatively very different. For instance, consider the effect 
of an increase in w·: it raises 00; / ow; making it more profitable for firm j to 
raise wages, but it also raises O!!;jOWi and thus w;. Since wages are strategic 
complements, firm j would react to an increase in Wi by increasing its own 
wage. This is precisely the strategic effect missing in models of monopolistic 
competition, which biases ow; / OW· downwards in this latter kind of models. 
Proposition 2 At any interior equilibrium (wi, wi) featuring stmtegic sub­
stitutability, firm j 's equilibrium wage (employment) is locally increasing (de­
creasing) in f3; and Mi, but locally decreasing (increasing) in M; and f3" 
i f j, i , j = 1,2. 
Proposition 2 focuses on the case where wages are strategic substitutes. 
Our basic comparative statics results are substantially modified with resp.ect 
to the strategic complements case in Proposition 1. The equilibrimn wage, 
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wj , still rises as firm j's union becomes more powerful in the bargaining 
process (as (3j rises) or as Mj shrinks, but it now falls with {3i, firm i's union 
power. This is because as {3i rises firm i's wage also rises, which makes it more 
profitable for firm j to cut its wages in order to win a greater share of the 
market. Since for these values of the {3's the bargaining outcome is dictated 
by managers incentives, wj must fall. A similar intuition also applies for 
reductions in Mi. Also in contrast with the strategic complements case, the 
effect on equilibrium wages of an increase in w· is, in principle, ambiguous. 
Of course, raising w·· has a positive direct effect on firms' wages since it 
strengthens the bargaining positions of unions by reducing each member's 
marginal loss from a lay-off. However, given strategic substitutability, as the 
rival's wage increases, it is more profitable to cut one's wage, which pushes 
equilibrium wages in the opposite direction. Remarkably, this case has been 
ignored, not only in the literature on monopolistic competition, but also in 
the existing oligopolistic models such as Davidson (1988) and Dowrick (1989). 
3.2 NUMERICAL COMPUTATIONS 
As regards the comparative statics results concerning the variables contained 
in vector 02, we have to resort to numerical computations in order to sign 
those effects. We have found that the results lack robustness with respect 
to the various parameter configurations which yield equilibria as well as to 
the values of {3. This outcome challenges comparative statics results arising 
from models which ignore strategic interactions. 
Take, for instance, the effect of productivity changes on wages. In pre-
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vious models, this effect is unambiguously positive. See, however, Figure 6, 
which, starting from' the parameter values underlying the symmetric example 
in Figure 3, evaluates the numerator of (11) ,  1)j , along the equilibrium locus 
as the relative bargaining power of firm j's union increases. The effect is 
negative for low values of {3;, and positive for larger values. This pattern is 
the result of a change in sign of the strategic 020.;/OW/YOI.k and direct effects 
020.j/OWjOOl.k discussed above. 
Similar effects are found for the remaining components of 01.2, implying 
that changes in the firms' productivity or brand quality and in their rivals' 
have effects which depend very much on the actual value of {3. 
4 EXTENSIONS 
4.1 WAGES AND PRODUCT MARKET CONCEN­
TRATION 
Does competition policy affect equilibrium wages? Are wages positively or 
negatively related to the degree of concentration in the product market? 
How are the wage-setting incentives of managers and unions changed as the 
industry becomes more competitive? This section answers these questions in 
light of our model. 
Let us consider an n-firm version of our basic model where, in addition 
and for simpliCity only, we suppose that all firms are identical. The first 
point to notice is that, as n increases and lhe market becomes more compet­
itive, the wage-setting incentives of managers and unions change in opposite 
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directions. While managers become less eager to undercut rivals' wages (i.e., 
82rr;/8w;8n :::: 0) and, therefore, more accommodating in the bargaining ta­
ble, unions exert less pressure to raise wages (i.e., 82U;/8w;8n :O; 0). Thus, 
from the viewpoint of the former, wage reductions are relatively less prof­
itable when the industry works with very small price-cost margins, that is, 
when the market is very competitive.21 For unions, on the contrary, as n 
rises a wage increase becomes less valuable since it is less likely that mem­
ber workers could enjoy the higher wage, as the survival probability of any 
insider falls with n. Furthermore, the fall in the survival probability is larger 
for higher wages. 
Therefore, the overall relationship between equilibrium wages and market 
coneentration is, in principle, ambiguous. Our main interest is, however, in 
understanding the behavior of wages when unions do matter. Hence, suppose 
that union's bargaining power is such that (i) 82n;/8w;8w; :::: 0 for all i # j, 
i ,j  = 1, . . . , n, and (ii) 82n;/8w;8n = 82rr;/8w;8n + f3;82U;/8w;8n :0; O. 
Then our n-firm bargaining game shows strategic complementarity and an 
increase in n leads to lower wages. It follows that in oligopolistic industries 
with powerful unions and where wages are bargained for at the firm level, 
wages and concentration ratios are positively correlated. Therefore, com­
petition policy may play a role in moderating unions' wage claims and in 
restraining cost-push inflation. 
Suppose that condition (i) above still holds but now take 82n;/8w;8n :::: 
O. Then, we obtain the paradoxical result that equilibrium wages are larger, 
the larger the number of firms in the market. The intuition is that as n 
increases the payoff associated with a wage cut (a marginal increase in firms' 
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efficiency) falls. (A similar result is obtained by Martin (1993) in a completely 
unrelated model, featuring incomplete information and separation between 
ownership and control.) 
4.2 SINGLE-UNION BARGAINING 
So far we have only analyzed a totally uncoordinated wage bargain. We now 
briefly discuss the outcomes of more coordinated bargaining processes. For 
this purpose, it is useful to realize that unions may find it easier to collude 
than managers. In both cases there are clear incentives to collude: managers 
(unions) would like to internalize the negative (positive) externality they 
create on each other when choosing wage levels. 
Since unions' objectives are not in conflict, as they all benefit from simul­
taneous wage increases at their corresponding firms, collusive agreements 
among them should naturally arise to avoid potential coordination failures. 
In principle, all that is needed is that unions communicate with each other 
to coordinate their bargaining strategies, since none of them will have an 
incentive to cheat once an agreement is reached. On the contrary, collusion 
among managers is unlikely to be sustainable. They could propose mutually 
taking into account the effects of their own wages on the competitor's profits 
at the bargaining stage. But even if this proposal was initially accepted, it 
would never be privately optimal to honor this agreement, because managers' 
objectives are in clear opposition. Indeed, each manager wants its rival to 
raise wages in order to undercut him and so win over some additional market 
share. Only an institution, like an employers' association, empowered to im-
- 36 -
pose penalties or exclude deviators from other association-provided benefits, 
would be able to enforce the agreement. 
Therefore, we should expect that managers fail to coordinate their strate­
gies while unions succeed in taking into accmmt the impact of their wage 
claims on other unions' welfare.22 In this case, firm j's objective function 
becomes 11; = II; + (3;(U; + U,), i # j, and firm j's equilibrium wage, w;', 
solves: 
&11;/&w; = &II;/&w; + (3;(&U;/&w; + &U;j&w;) = 0, j = 1, 2. (12) 
From equations (9) and (12), and given that &U,/&w; > 0 for all wi, 
we have that &11;/ &w; > 0 for w; = w;. Given that 11; is concave for the 
relevant {3;-range, it follows that wi' � w;, the equilibrium wage for the 
uncoordinated bargaining model, for all j. In addition, from (12) it should 
be clear that a manager facing a more powerful union than his competitor's 
would prefer single-union bargaining, while the opposite is true for the other 
manager. The intuition for this result is that single-union bargaining reduces 
wag" differentials across firms. 
If, in spite of our previous considerations, the managers of different firms 
also find a way to cooperate among themselves, so that industry wages are 
decided collectively among all unions and managers in the industry, firm 
j's equilibrium wage, wi, maximizes the joint payoff function III + 1l2, thus 
solving 
&II;/&w; + &II;j&w; + {3;&U;/&w; + {3,&U;j&w; = 0, j = 1,2. (13) 
Since &U;j &w; and &II;j &w; are both positive and {3; and {3, are such that 
III + 112 is locally concave, then wi � w; for all j.  (Note that wi and wi' 
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cannot be easily compared without additional assumptions on the parameters 
of the model.) 
In conclusion, we have shown that, for a broad set of assumptions on 
the way coordinated bargaining is conducted, equilibrium wages are higher 
under coordination. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper contributes to a new strand of literature which emphasizes the 
strategic interactions that take place between wage-bargaining unions and 
employment-setting firms. 
We have shown that the effects on equilibrium wages of various labor 
and product market characteristics depend on the strategic nature of the 
wage process. More precisely, the impact of those variables has been shown 
to depend on whether wages in different firms are strategic complements or 
substitutes (i.e., whether increases in one firm's wage lead to an increase or a 
decrease in other firms' wages), the former case being more likely the higher 
is the bargaining power of unions at the different firms. 
Our analysis has yielded three main sets of results. First, we have de­
parted from the symmetric setting, which characterizes most of the existing 
literature, in terms of bargaining strength, technology and demand. The sym­
metric setting precludes the investigation of several interesting cross-effects 
of unions, for which the strategic nature of wages matters crucially. Second, 
and most importantly, we have shown that the predictions of models which 
ignore strategic interactions or that assume overall strategic complementar-
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ity can be overturned. For example, increased productivity in one firm may 
lead to lower, not .higher, wages in that firm; and an increase in a union's 
bargaining power at one firm may lead to lower wages at competing firms if 
wages are strategic substitutes. 
Thirdly, extensions of the model have provided new results on several is­
sues. For example, unions' bargaining power needs t.o reach a cert.ain thresh­
old to ensure that a decrease in product. market compet.it.ion will lead t.o 
higher wages. Also, we have shown t.hat. t.aking into account the different 
viewpoint.s of unions and managers regarding the strategic nature of the bar­
gaining process helps us ,mderstand why unions may find it easier to collude 
than managers. 
Lastly, this paper could shed light on the specification of wage equations 
in empirical work. From the previous results it is clear that, once strategic 
interactions among competing finns are recognized, variables such as the 
competitors' productivity or their employees' bargaining power should enter 
the standard insider-outsider wage equations at the firm or sectoral levels 
which are found in the literature. Moreover, our results suggest that standard 
measures of market power, like industry concentration ratios, could better 
capture the link between market power and wages if interacted with measures 
of workers' bargaining power. 
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APPENDIX 1. SOME USEFUL RESULTS 
RESULT I :  Properties of Sj and Uj 
From the definition of Sj in equation (7) in the text we can distinguish 
three regions depending on the value of 0;: Region I (0; :5 Il), Region 2 (Il < 
0; :5 0), and Region 3 (OJ > 0). The value of 0; is such that N;(Oj) = Mj. 
Thus, using equation (5): 
0; = 3ajMj + 2wj - W" (A.I) 
N;(O) = (0 - 2wj + w,)/3aj (A.2) 
Using equation (2) we have that: 
(a)oUj/OWj = (OSj/OWj)(Wj - w·) + Sj (A.3) 
(b)OUj/ow, = (OSj/ow,) (Wj - w·) (A.4) 
(C)02Uj/OWJ = (o2Sj/owmWj - w·) + 2(osj/oWj) (A.5) 
(d)02Uj/Ow,Wj = (02Sj/ow,OWj)(Wj - w·) + (OSj/ow,) (A.6) 
Therefore, we have the following cases: 
Region 1: In this case Sj = 1 and all derivatives with respect to its 
arguments are zero. Hence (aj = I and (bj = (cj = (dj = O. 
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Region 2: In this case: 
8 - IJ' 1.9; N'(IJ) 
S · = --' + -'-dlJ , t:. � Mjt:. 
Using Leibnitz's rule and noticing that Nj(IJ;) = Mj, we get: 
(A.7) 
1 9' oN'(IJ) 
OSj/OWj = Mt:. 1. '  o�. = -2(1J; - H.)/'I!j < 0 (A.8) , - , 
where 'I! j = 3a; Mj t:.. 
Similarly, 
where 'I!'j = 3a;ajMjt:.. 
OSj/OW, = (IJ; - H.)'I!'j > 0 
02S;/OW; 
= 
-4/'I!j < 0 
02s;/ow,OWj = 2/'I!'j > 0 
(A.9) 
(A.lO) 
(A. l l )  
Given the previous derivatives we have that: sign(a» « )  0, sign(b» 0, 
sign(c)< 0, and sign(d» O. 
Region 3: In this case: 
1.9 N' (IJ) 
Sj = 9 �.t:. 
dlJ. - , 
Thus, using similar arguments as above, we get 
OSj/OWj = -2(8 - H.)/'I!j < 0 
OSj/OW, = (8 - H.)/'I!'j > 0 
02Sj/OW; = 0 
02Sj/ow,OWj = 0 
(A.12) 
(A.L3) 
(A.14) 
(A.15) 
(A.L6) 
Therefore: sign(a» « )  0, sign(b» 0, sign(c)< 0, sign(d» O . • 
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RESULT 2: Properties of n; 
From the definition of 73; we have that 
(A.17) 
so that for /3;(., .) > 73;(., .) , n; is concave. Then, it can be shown that 73;(. , .) 
is decreasing in w;. This is so since, from the chosen functional forms for II; 
and U;, we have that 82II;/8wJ is a constant and -82U;/8wJ is increasing 
in Wj' 
Since 73;(., .) is decreasing in w; and w; E [w", wtJ, it follows that 73;(·, ·) E 
[7J;(. , wf) ,73; (· ,w")]. Three cases may arise: (i) if /3; > 73;( · ,w"), then n; is 
globally concave; (ii) if /3; < 73;(- ,  wf), then n; is globally convex; and, (iii) 
if /3; E [7J;(- , wf),73;(·, w")], by continuity there will always exist a value 
w; E [w" ,wtJ such that /3; = 73;( · ,w;), which implies that n; will be convex 
for w; < w; and concave otherwise. Thus, for given Wi, if n; is concave at w", 
it will be concave for all feasible values of w;. Conversely, if n; is convex at 
wj , it will be convex for all feasible values of wi' Finally, in the intermediate 
case, n; will always be first convex and then concave (as in Figure 1) . •  
RESULT 3: Deriving the inequality /3; :2: 73; 
From the definitions of the cut-off points 73; = 73; (Wi, wi) and /3; = 
/3;(Wi, W;) in the three regions that characterize $; (see Result 1), we have: 
(A.18) 
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and 
I 0 (Region 1) 8 -= 9aJ + f3j -4(0; - ft + Wj - WO)/Wj (Region 2) -4l:./Wj (Region 3) 
o = 82rrj/8wi8wj + f3;82Uj/8wi8wj (A.19) 
I 0 (Region 1) -4 = -9 + f3; (O,� - ft + 2(wj - WO))/Wij (Region 2) a;aj l:./W ij (Region 3) 
Thus, we have the following three cases: 
(i) In Region 1, Tlj --+ 00 and f3; --+ 00, so there will only be corner 
solutions, which we disregard in the analysis. 
(ii) In Region 2, we get from the previous expressions that: 
f3� /Tl = 
2«0; - ft) + (Wj - WO)) > 
1 
1 1 (OJ - ft) + 2(wj - wO) 
(A.20) 
(iii) In Region 3, we get from the previous expression that: 
f3; /Tlj = 2 (A.21) 
Therefore, in general we have f3; :::: Tlj • •  
RESULT 4: Strategic complementarity in Region 3 
In order to prove that for Wj E [WO, wjJ, f3j :::: f3;(Wi ,Wj) for all feasible 
values of Wi we proceed by contradiction. 
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Let us assume that there exists a (3; such that (3; < (3; (Wi, w;) and that 
w; is an interior sohltion, namely, it. sat.isfies t.he first.-order conditions: 
0 = 80.;/8w; = (J.L-2W; +Wi)((3j/3f1fjaj-4/9aj)-(3;tl/1Jt;(2w; +2(w; -w")) 
(A.22) 
with J.L = E(O) = (0 + Q.)/2, which is easily obtainable from the functional 
fonns of II; and U; .  Since the first and the third terms in parentheses are 
positive, it must be t.hat the second term is also positive, i. e., (3; > 4Mj /3. 
However, from Result 3 we know that in Region 3, (3; = 4Mj /3. Hence, if 
(3j < (3; the requirement is not fulfilled and Wj cannot be an interior solution, 
i. e., a contradiction . •  
APPENDIX 2. N UMERlCAL COMP UTATION OF 
EQUILIBRlA 
This appendix explains how we compute numerically the equilibrium val­
ues of Wi and Wj. The functional forms we have chosen yield a quadratic first­
order condition for each firm. Any candidate interior equilibrium (w;, wi) 
must jointly solve the following system of equations: 
BjW; + (Cj + DjWi)Wj + (Ejw; + FjWi + Gj) = 0; i f.  j, i ,j  = 1, 2. (A.23) 
where: 
Bj = 3/a�, Cj = (6ajMj - 4vj + 2Vi - 4Mj(9 - Q.)/(3(3j) - 2w"/aj - 2Q.)/aj, 
Dj = -2/(aja;), Ej = 1/4a;, 
Fj = (-3ajMj + 2vj - Vi + 4Mj(9 - Q.)/3(3j + 2w" /aj + Q.)/2a;, 
Gj = -Hj3Mj(9 - Q.)/2(3j, 
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and, 
H = -fl·(9a2M - 12a M v + 6a·M·v· + 4v2 - 4v·v· + v2)/(6a M (e - e)) J J ) J 1 1 1 J ] I J J �  J 1 1  -
+(4/(9aj) + flj(2w"/aj + fi)/(3ajMj(e - fi)))/(3ajMj - 2vj + Vi) 
-fl;fl(fi/2 - 2w" /aj)/(3ajMj(e - fi)) - 4((0 - fi)/2 + 3ajMj)/(9aj) + flj . 
Numerically we compute the candidate equilibria by solving the first-order 
conditions using the software package Maple. Once a solution is found, we 
check that the candidate equilibrium wages are real numbers strictly above 
the alternative wage, which yield positive production levels in all states of 
nature, satisfy the local second-order conditions, and are such that no firm 
has an incentive to change its wage (taking the other firm's wage as given). 
Lastly, we check whether the equilibrium is stable. 
The parameters underlying Figures 3 and 4 are as follows, for all j: e = 
1600, fi = 800, w" = 50000, Mj = 2.5, Vj = 0, aj = 100; in Figure 3, flj =, 4, 
and flj = 5 in Figure 4. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 There is a long list of studies using monopolistic competition d la Dixit­
Stiglitz which could be cited. Good examples are Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987), and Layard et al. (1991). 
2 See, for instance, Pugel (1980) and Dickens and Katz (1987) for the 
US; Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) and Nickell et al. (1992) for the UK; and 
Bentolila and Dolado (1994) for Spain. 
3 For example, Clark and Oswald (1993) report survey evidence for the 
UK in which 86% of unions indicate that the level of employment is usually 
decided by the employer. 
• The use of conjectural variations for comparative statics purposes, once 
very popular among oligopoly theorists, is now much questioned. As an 
instance of today's mainstream view, Shapiro (1989, p. 354), in his survey 
on oligopoly theory in the Handbook of Industrial Organization, claims that 
" . . .  the idea behind conjectural variations is logically flawed, and they carmot 
constitute a bona fide theory of oligopoly." 
5 For US empirical evidence on the importance of this phenomenon see, 
for instance, Flanagan (1976) and Mehra (1976). 
6 Both this sequence of play and the implicit assumption that the parties 
bargain without knowing the bargaining outcome at the rival firm seem to 
be empirically supported (see Svejnar, 1986). 
7 Suppose that the union's bargaining objectives are decided by voting 
using a simple majority rule. Then, the union's objective function is given 
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by the preferences of its median member. But given that workers are risk 
neutral and that layoffs are assigned randomly, the preferences of the latter 
coincide with the preferences of any other union member (see Layard et ai., 
1991, chapter 2). 
8 Firm j's laid-off workers join the pool of unemployed, which is assumed 
to be large enough so that the probability of being employed by firm i, i oj j ,  
in the current period is negligible. Hence, search considerations are ignored 
for simplicity. 
9 Unemployment may exist in this economy due to, for instance, matching 
frictions. 
10 Alternatively, we might have assumed 0; to be equal to II; (U; )�; (the 
Nash maximand) , as is standard in the related literature on wage bargaining. 
This solution concept has been used extensively, because it can be derived 
as the subgame perfect equilibrium of a non-cooperative game of alternating 
offers (see Binmore et al. (1986) and Davidson (1988)). From an axiomatic 
point of view, our solution concept only differs from the Nash maximand 
in that it does not satisfy the axiom of invariance to affine transformations. 
(Both solution concepts satisfy the axioms of independence of irrelevant al­
ternatives and Pareto efficiency.) But given that we assume that II; and U; 
are defined in "monetary" terms, so that affine transformations of II; and U; 
do modify the nature of the bargaining problem, the axiom of invariance to 
affine transformations is actually undesirable in our context. 
11 We therefore ignore the strategic use of wage settlements in order to 
foreclose rivals in the product market (see Kiihn (1994)). 
12 That is, it is common knowledge that negotiations at the firm level 
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satisfy equation (4), for all competing firms. 
13 This result holds in the absence of efficiency wage considerations, which 
could be introduced by making productivity, aj, to depend on equilibrium 
wages. 
14 It can be easily shown that managers regard wages as strategic substi­
tutes irrespectively of whether they set quantities or prices ex post. (A formal 
proof of this statement can be obtained from the authors upon request.) 
15 0; is uniquely determined since, for all j, Nj (0) is strictly increasing 
for all 0, and Mj is constant. 
16 wj (wt) is the maximum wage level that can be paid by firm j (i) with­
out going bankrupt. We have already shown that this is equivalent to having 
non-negative production levels at u.. Thus, for a given wi, q,(Wl, W2; U.) ::0: 0, 
implies that Wi ::; (U. + wj)/2. At the same time, Q;(Wl, W2; U.) ::0: 0 implies 
that Wj ::; (U. - wi)/2 ::; (U. - wj)/4, from the previous inequality. Hence it 
must be that Wj ::; u.. Since w, == w, / aj - v" the latter inequality implicitly 
defines wf . 
17 See Clark (1984), Ruback and Zimmerman (1984), Salinger (1984), and 
Abowd (1989). 
18 Note that condition (i) alone is not sufficient, because the lack of quasi­
concavity of fl" and also that we do not need to consider deviations to any 
Wj > w·, given the overall shape of flj (see Figure 1 and Result 2 in Appendix 
1). 
19 The parameter values underlying these figures and the calculation 
method followed to derive them are contained in Appendix 2. 
20 Any interior equilibrium (w;, w2) is stable if and only if, at this point 
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and for all i ,j ,  I 02rlj/OWJ I - I 02rlj/OWjOW, I� O. This difference is con­
tinuous and monotonically increasing in {3j, strictly negative at {3j (wi, W2), 
and strictly positive at {3; (wi, w2)· Hence, there exists a ,8j (wi, w,) E 
({3j (wi, w,) , {3; (wi,w,)), such that if {3j � ,8j (wi,w,), the equilibrium is 
stable. 
21 Given our assumptions on the product market (section 2.1), it .is a 
standard result that firms' price-cost margins fall as the number of firms 
operating in the market rises. (See, e.g., Tirole, 1988, chapter 5.) 
22 This is identical to assuming that there is a single union per indus­
try, whose members are the insiders of firms 1 and 2, and which bargains 
separately with each firm's manager. 
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